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THE IRREGULAR WARFARE CZAR

by

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Preface

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Abstract

While there have been numerous successes related to the current war on terrorism, the United States' momentum seems to be waning as we have moved from a traditional World War Two method of engagement to one of irregular warfare (IW). This paper concerns itself with, not how to successfully fight an IW campaign, but who should lead these efforts in a whole of government approach. Presidents have used czars within their administrations for a myriad of reasons but the underlying basis has been to have a focal point to direct a whole-of-government approach respective to their assignment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of the interagency and have a single person responsible to the president for leading these efforts and with the authority to implement them – the IW Czar.

Chapter 1

The Irregular Warfare Czar

In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations.

-Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 06

Since America's last "traditional" war in 1991, the United States has continued to experience tremendous military successes. Starting with devastating the then, world's third-largest army (Iraq) and removing them from Kuwait in less than two months, to establishing an environment where peace could be established in the Balkans, to removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and finally, toppling Saddam Hussein's ruthless rule in a matter of a few weeks, America's dominance in martial conflict is unmatched. However, as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated above, the nature of warfare has changed. America is no longer engaged in the conventional wars of old, where the last army standing was the winner, but a more complex, integrated campaign that has been labeled irregular warfare.

So what is IW? The military definition of IW is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in

order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.”¹ It is a war where your enemy may be shooting at you one day, yet, be part of a peace plan the next day.

Certainly, America has no peer in conventional military power. The United States Navy’s fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined and an American soldier has not been killed from enemy air attacks since Korea, due to the U.S. Air Force’s complete air supremacy in combat. General James Mattis, Commander of Joint Forces Command, puts it succinctly, “You take on the U.S. Air Force, or the naval aviation, Marine aviation, at 15,000 feet in a fighter...you only have one role: fugitive...You’d better fly away real fast or you’re going to get shot out of the air. You take on the U.S. Navy on the high seas; they’ll burn you to the waterline. That’s all there is to it. You take on the U.S. Army in the open desert, in open terrain, mechanized warfare, the Army will annihilate you.”² Few would argue America has the most powerful military in the world to counter any martial threats to our national security; however, military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in the current environment of irregular warfare.

The United States’ dominance in conventional warfare has given our present and potential enemies, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, reasons to change to asymmetric methods. To counter this, America’s strategy, including all instruments of power, must adapt to fighting non-traditional battles and waging irregular warfare and build their capacity to operate in unstable or hostile environments. And as General Mattis pointed out, “Every military that transformed, that changed, that modernized, did so on the basis of one thing,” he said. “They identified a problem and solved it.”³

¹ Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 Aug 2007, viii.

² William H. McMichael, “Mattis Calls for Small-Unit, Irregular Skills,” *Navy Times*, February 16, 2009 http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/02/military_mattis_irregularwarfare_021309w/.

³ Ibid.

The military has identified the problem of warfare today as being one of irregular more than traditional. The 2008 National Defense Strategy plainly states, "...we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat."⁴ To this end, the United States military is retooling its training, doctrine, and operations to win in the non-traditional combat arena. The military's leader, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, has made it very clear that irregular warfare is how the U.S. military will be engaged for some time. "Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies."⁵

Consequently, successful irregular warfare campaigns will not be won on just the battlefield. The DoD will need "patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW."⁶ These cross agency operations have already occurred; in Afghanistan, lawyers from the Department of Justice are assisting in codifying a set of laws from century's old tribal customs. Another example of progress in IW is also found in Afghanistan, where agriculture experts from Texas have been working in remote areas to help herders better manage their livestock, and to better deal with ever-changing environmental conditions. This project has also helped peacefully resolve conflicts over grazing

⁴ Department of Defense, *2008 National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, 4.

⁵ Robert Gates, "A Balance Strategy; Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103-p0/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.html>.

⁶ Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0*, 11 September 2007, 1.

rights on the Afghan range. In another facet of successful IW operations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided monies to help establish jobs programs to replace building improvised explosive devices in remote areas of Afghanistan.

Hence, coordinating all U.S. government agencies involved in foreign affairs during policy formulation is and will be for the very long future, the critical challenge. In several other areas of operating the federal government, the administration of President Barrack Obama has established “czars” or high-level staff members who will help oversee the administration's top initiatives on issues ranging from healthcare, the economy, energy to urban issues. The idea of these “super aides,” who work across interagency lines advancing the president's agenda, is not a new one. President Nixon named the first czar with his appointment of William E. Simon to handle the 1970s energy crisis and in 2007, former President Bush named Lieutenant General Douglas Lute as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.

There is some angst, however, in these appointments coming from lawmakers. They fear that the President is setting up a system that is not subject to congressional oversight and creates the potential for conflict among his many advisors. In February, 2009, Senator Robert Byrd, became concerned enough to send a cautionary letter to the president. He stated, “They rarely testify before congressional committees and often shield the information and decision-making process behind the assertion of executive privilege,” Byrd wrote about past czars and White House staffers in similar positions. He continued saying, one outcome has been to “inhibit openness and transparency, and reduce accountability.”⁷

However, with the absolute complexity of irregular warfare and the numerous departments and branches of the federal government required to effectively operate a campaign, it is

⁷ Noelle Straub, “Sen. Byrd Questions Obama’s Use of Policy Czars,” *New York Times*, 25 February 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/02/25/25greenwire-byrd-questions-obamas-use-of-policy-czars-9865.html>.

imperative there is one, single unifying authority directing these efforts. There have been too many numerous operations that a lack of integration between agencies translated to either inaction or misused action on the ground, such as Somalia in the mid-1990s. There have been independent and uncoordinated operations resulting in military success not being strategic success, like the early post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Because IW will span all instruments of U.S. national power; (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic), and the accompanying policy and budget issues, there must be one person in charge. Until this is done there will be turf battles, uncertainty, delays, and ineffectiveness. Consequently, the establishment of an irregular warfare czar to be the one focal point for all these facets is necessary and required for ultimate success in our twenty-first century conflicts.

To find this person, there are several avenues addressed throughout this paper. First, who is our enemy in the IW fight? Every senior military leader and student of our military professional educational schools can quote the first rule of warfare: “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”⁸ Yet, is the USG acting in accordance with Carl von Clausewitz’s counsel and defining our enemy clearly enough?

Although the government is weighted down with different strategies on how to secure our national strategies and security, the IW campaign still needs a leader who can combine the varying ingredients and produce a successful IW whole-of-government approach. A study of William J. Bennett, the nation’s first drug czar and his unenviable task of bringing order to the

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 75.

federal government's fragmented efforts against an epidemic of drug use shows just how hard the job will be if an IW czar is ever named. Bennett had several positive and negative features of a newly appointed czar that can be applied to the IW discipline.

There is an avenue of thought that the National Security Council and its' role in producing and executing America's strategic goals and objectives would be better suited to supervise IW efforts. Yet, the National Security Advisor's responsibilities lie outside the scope of IW-only and require a much broader range of topics to handle. Finally, will an IW czar-like person truly be needed to achieve a greater unity of effort to conduct complex contingency operations and why we need legislation to update our national security system to fight and defeat today's' enemy in an irregular warfare campaign.

Chapter 2

Today's Enemy

That is the whole secret of successful fighting. Get your enemy at a disadvantage; and never, on any account, fight him on equal terms.

—Nobel Laureate George Bernard Shaw

Throughout the last two hundred years of conflict involving American military forces, almost all combat operations can be characterized by significant threats to our national security interests with a clearly identifiable enemy. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are similar; there is a threat to our national security but our military, with certain exceptions, notably our Special Operators, are not trained to fight a non-definable enemy. Additionally, the United States begins most irregular conflicts from a position of perceived strength and consequently, we tend to disregard most of the instruments of power and default to our military might. Once started, America's military instrument of power treats irregular warfare as a lesser version of conventional war, relying on force and technological advantage for victory. However, that is changing.

In IW operations, the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. As the 2006, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) points out, the United States needs to take “an indirect approach, building up and working with others. This indirect approach seeks to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest

or in the manner they expect to be attacked.”⁹ To try and understand the current crises, we need to try and define the enemy.

Fundamental Islam

The current war is with an enemy that has consistently and brazenly shown its terrorist syllabus through several decades of action: They killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983, bombed the Khobar Towers in 1996 and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, attacked the USS Cole in 2000, brought down the Twin Towers in 2001, bombed the Madrid train system in 2004, planted two bombs in Bali, Indonesia night clubs in 2005, and attacked the London’s transit system in 2005; brutal acts that span the globe and were targeted against Western interests. It is not just the pure violence the terrorists import but their stated goal of spreading fundamental Islam throughout the globe. As former President Bush noted in his 2006 National Security Strategy, “From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the terrorists and against their murderous ideology.”¹⁰

This war is with Islamist radicals who use terror as a weapon to try and advance their philosophy. The 9/11 Commission Report states, “...the enemy is not just ‘terrorism’, some generic evil. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by *Islamist* terrorism – especially the Al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”¹¹ The report defines radical Islamism as a “militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate.”¹² A return of the caliphate is not the defining goal of mainstream Islam, only its radical factions, which would like to move

⁹ Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 11.

¹⁰ President, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,” 9.

¹¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the US, “The 9-11 Commission Report,” page 362.

backward to theocracy and a strict adherence to Sharia, or laws based on Islamic principles of jurisprudence. This path strikes right into the heart of the conflict.

The American way of life is seen as a threat to a pure Muslim way by the fundamentalists. Through their distorted view of Islam, the terrorists have resorted to violence to try and achieve their goals. Osama Bin Laden, in his fatwa against the West said, “The ruling is to kill the Americans and their allies. It is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it, in order to liberate the Al Aqsa mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca]... This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God...We call on every Muslim who believes in God and wished to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.”¹³ As one political scientist put it, having America as the enemy allows radical Islamics to blame their problems onto America's shoulders. The U.S. is the truly the perfect foil for the Islamists; if America did not exist, they would have to invent it.

America's role in the growing conflict follows a typical post-World War II pattern of engagement, best viewed as a combination of good intentions and bad execution. The U.S. National Security Strategy, while it appears open and full of global opportunity to Americans, comes across as heavy-handed and threatening to others, including some of our allies. A 2008 poll by the Pew Institute shows that three heavily Muslim-populated countries' favorable attitudes toward the U.S. ranged from a “high” of thirty-seven percent for Indonesia, nineteen percent of Pakistan, to only twelve percent of Turks.¹⁴ The U.S. failure to understand and empathize with Muslim issues has led to an overwhelmingly negative view of America in the

¹² Ibid, page 562, note 3.

¹³ Statement of Osama Bin Laden, “Fatwahs and Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Two Holy Places,” <http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/burning/africa-bombings.html>.

¹⁴ “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)”, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=263>, released on December 18, 2008.

Muslim world, and a public relations abyss that seems to get deeper with every dollar and resource Americans pour into democracy programs across the globe.

Consequently, in confronting Islamist terrorism, we cannot use containment as we did against the Soviet Union. In the Cold War, neither side ever directly attacked the other, due to the risk of nuclear escalation. The concept of “mutually assured destruction” provided some sense of peculiar comfort level of peace. However, after been attacked on our own soil, U.S. policy is to kill Islamist terrorists on their territory. It is a plan centered on military kinetic energy, and woefully short on the other instruments of national power. Former President Bush’s statement of “you’re either with us or against us in this fight against terror” policy has forced the United States to execute a very complex and vague war rather than the almost absolute clarity of our Cold War enemies.¹⁵

Despite the growing list of terrorism acts, it seems that America’s positive attitude toward succeeding in the fight against terrorism is fading. In an ABC News/Washington Post Poll conducted during September, 2008, 1,133 adults nationwide were asked, “Do you think the U.S. campaign against terrorism is going very well, fairly well, not too well or not well at all?” Of these, 48% responded “fairly well”, yet, 20% said “not too well”. This negative response is a 500% increase since asked the same question six years earlier.¹⁶ Why?

Americans associate success with clearly defined ends. The fall of Nazi Germany, the defeat of imperialist Japan, and the break up of the Soviet Union – all had traditional state actors and their demise was clearly documented. There is a little doubt that a visibly defined enemy would almost be welcomed in today’s fight, yet, the U.S. does not have that luxury.

¹⁵ Cable News Network, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html>.

¹⁶ ABC-Washington Post Poll, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm>, September, 2008.

To borrow from Sun Tzu, the U.S. has defined its enemy as the threat of terror from Islamic fundamentalists' groups. These organizations have tried to use religion and hatred to promote the idea of pan-Islamic political unity, and the elimination of any Western influences in the Muslim world. They desire to have an Islamic state implementing Sharia law and would be in direct conflict with Western conceptions of a secular, democratic state with equal human rights. Among these principles disputed by radical Islamists, are the equality in public life between men and women, the separation of religion and state, the freedom of speech, and freedom of religion; all basic tenants of American society and law. We know the fundamentalists want to kill Americans to promote their beliefs and we know it will take an irregular warfare approach to succeed in defeating them. We know who our enemy is and where we need to direct these operations. However, as we enter our seventh year of sustained combat in Southwest Asia and engagements around the world, who at the strategic level is directing the efforts of IW and its full range of capabilities needed for success.

Chapter 3

The Drug Czar and the IW Czar

There are no problems we cannot solve together, and very few that we can solve by ourselves.

-President Lyndon B. Johnson

Perhaps the best approach to establishing an IW czar is found in the office created to counter the nation's drug problems. Prior to the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988, there was no federal agency responsible for coordinating all the issues to complete the drug war goals, much like the irregular warfare operations of today. Each agency acted independently of each other, with very little coordination, and each had their own drug control budget. The drug control issues that faced the Reagan/Bush-41 administration are very similar to the IW ones facing the Obama administration today; who is in charge, who makes the policy, and who coordinates the efforts of this policy?

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), a component of the Executive Office of the President, was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. This law "established the creation of a drug-free America as a policy goal. A key provision of that act was the establishment of the ONDCP to set priorities, implements a national strategy, and certify federal drug-control budgets."¹⁷ To help achieve these goals, the Director of ONDCP (the drug czar) is charged with producing the National Drug Control Strategy, which in turns directs the

country's anti-drug efforts and establishes a program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local agencies.

By law, the Director of ONDCP also evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts sustain and complement State and local anti-drug activities. The Director advises the president regarding changes in the organization, management, budgeting, and personnel of federal Agencies that could affect the nation's anti-drug efforts; and regarding federal agency compliance with their obligations under the strategy. All of these requirements found of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 are exactly what is needed of the IW czar's office and fortunately, there is an historical example in William J. Bennett, our nation's first drug czar, to help shape and define the IW czar.

William J. Bennett

Bennett was President George H. W. Bush's choice to coordinate the federal government's battle against illegal drugs. He was President Reagan's Education Secretary and while at that job he criticized his own administration's drug policies, perhaps leading to the phrase be careful what you wish for. He consistently opined that the policies needed to be more coherent, more direct, and he called for an all-out war on drugs-with more resources for police, more prosecutors, and more convictions. It was a job created with an unenviable position; he would oversee the work of several long-feuding federal agencies, and his authority and budget were uncertain much like an IW czar's would be today.

¹⁷ Office of the National Drug Control Policy,
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/authorizing_legislation.html

In his three years at the Education Department, Mr. Bennett was probably the most visible chief education officer America has had. Yet, he left many in the educational community wondering whether he had actually harmed the cause of better schooling. He was cheered by many educators when he called for a return to the basics and urged schools to tighten their curriculums and raise standards but he was attacked for devoting little time to working with Congress and for unnecessarily alienating teachers' groups and much of the rest of the educational establishment.

When established, the drug czar was not a Cabinet-level position but retained “Cabinet-level status.” Bennett was not discouraged by this, “A more important issue as far as I was concerned was whether the President had confidence in me, and whether that confidence would be conveyed to my colleagues.”¹⁸ Everyone did not agree with this perception. Former Senator, now Vice-President Joseph Biden, said, “...his not being at the table – I don’t care what you say – will at a minimum make the second-level people in each of the departments he has to deal with think he has less clout.”¹⁹

In Washington, more than any other place on earth, perception of one’s status is power. Not being a Cabinet secretary may have seemed trivial to Bennett but symbolism with very little resources and without clear authorities becomes a fragile anchor point in a new organization. U.S. News and World Report said about Bennett’s job, “the consensus assessment of Bennett’s fate is that he will become a figurehead. The czar will only have the power to cajole federal agencies not to order them around. Cynics bet Bennett will slowly sink into bureaucratic quicksand and be rendered irrelevant.”²⁰ Clearly, the drug czar job (and the IW czar job) needed

¹⁸ William John Bennett, *The De-valuing of America: The Fight for our Culture and our Children*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1992, 97.

¹⁹ Bennett, 98.

²⁰ Bennett, 98.

more than symbolism to produce tangible results and the personality of William Bennett helped and hindered this process.

With such a small staff (about a 100) and very little money, Bennett used a bully pulpit to coax, coerce and communicate to the dozens of federal agencies. His penchant for speaking out may have seemed like a strong-arm tactic to some but when vying for power within the beltway, he who speaks loudest sometimes wins. Senator Biden said, “The thing that made [Bennett] troublesome at Education may make him very valuable in this position. He’s never been afraid to pick a fight.”²¹

Depending on your view, this attribute could be either positive or negative, yet, it earned Bennett results. In 1990, the House Appropriations Committee cut \$230 million from the amount President Bush had proposed to spend on treatment, prevention and education programs. The czar’s response to the proposed cut was quick and loud. Instead of speaking to members of Congress directly to express his grievance, as was the normal practice, Bennett went directly to the press. This approach was effective, but earned him even more criticism from Congress for his lack of diplomatic skills. But by playing to the public’s perception that Congress was cutting money against the nation’s number one problem, he put Congress in a position in which it had to change its decision.

Although he had some successes using this approach, he had some memorable failures. He was unable to get the increases in funding from Congress that were proposed by the Office of Management and Budget, he constantly conflicted with the Justice Department over the power of the ONDCP and especially the Attorney General, and failed to influence the Customs Service when it shifted funds away from interdiction to what it considered more pressing obligations. However, the key takeaway in comparing Bennett with a potential IW czar is that Bill Bennett

was extremely partisan in his efforts. Before he introduced his national strategy for drug control, he met with the Republican National Committee chairman to make sure it aligned with their priorities. Naturally, this infuriated Democrats and led to their undermining his efforts. Shortly after the National Drug Control Strategy was presented, Bennett criticized Congress for its “lack of will” and preaching there was no “sense of urgency”.²²

Bennett was very successful at utilizing the media, but he had difficulty working with Congress and with the bureaucracy. When working, or trying to work with Congress, his partisanship and personal animosity hindered his ability to gain support. Within the beltway, his office lacked the standing to compete with the Justice Department and the OMB. His rants against Congress and open conflict with department and agency heads reduced his ability to win the cooperation and support required from the organizations he was to coordinate. Although a strong personality would be a prerequisite to the IW czar’s resume, the ability to cross party lines and work within agencies would be more valuable to lead an interagency effort. There are still arguments as whether Bennett was successful as the nation’s first drug czar (usually along party lines) but his ability to raise public concern and to raise issues with Congress is certainly a trait the IW czar will need.

By appointing one individual to control the USG’s irregular warfare efforts, there is a possibility that a strong personality like Bennett’s could be a impediment to interagency cooperation. By law, there is an already establish entity, the National Security Council, to manage and coordinate interagency actions but in the following chapter, I would argue they are not designed for IW operation management.

²¹ Bennett, 110.

²² Jack Kelley, “Drug Czar Down but Not Out: Bennett Familiar with Criticism, Rumors He’ll Quit,” USA Today, December 4, 1989, 3A.

Chapter 4

National Security Council and its role in Irregular Warfare

We came to the conclusion—soon confirmed by experience—that any extended military effort required over-all coordinated control in order to get the most out of the three armed forces....but we never had comparable unified direction or command in Washington. And even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in communication systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington.

—President Truman

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. Currently, the statutory members of the Council are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense; but, at the President's request, other senior officials participate in NSC deliberations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are also statutory advisers and in 2007, the Secretary of Energy was added to the NSC membership. The body is very dynamic; dependent upon the crisis or tone of the administration, the NSC may be broadened to indicate an expanding role of financial, environmental, or military issues in national security policymaking.

When it was created in 1947, the NSC was one of the least controversial sections of the National Security Act and drew little attention compared with the basic concept of a single military department, around which most of the congressional debate centered. When the NSC was finally considered in Congressional deliberations, the major issues were more to the

mechanics of the new organization, its membership, and assurances that it would be a civilian organization, not dominated by the new Secretary of the National Military Establishment, and whether future positions would require Senate approval.²³

President Truman did not truly embrace the idea that NSC was the central office to coordinate implementation of national security issues. He designated the Secretary of State as chairman, reinforcing his view that the State Department should play the major role in U.S. foreign policy. The Hoover Commission did the first review of NSC operations in January 1949 and found the NSC was not fully meeting coordination needs, “especially in the area of comprehensive statements of current and long-range policies.”²⁴ The Korean War changed this and thrust the NSC into a major role in national security policy.

The NSC has grown and retracted over the next fifty years, based on the personality of the president and the national security advisor. The council operates daily in a highly complex and uncertain international security environment. Tantamount to directing foreign policy and IW operations, the president’s capacity to respond to a complex, rapidly changing security environment centers on the effectiveness of the national security system he oversees and directs and the very senior people he charges to execute his vision.

National Security Advisor

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor, serves as the chief adviser to the President on national security issues. The National Security Advisor is appointed by the President without confirmation by the Senate and consequently, is not connected to the Departments of State or Defense or Congress and is

²³ General comments about the NSC formulation are found in the 80th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, v. 93, July 7, 1947, p. 8299 and July 9, 1947, pp. 8496-97, 8518, 8520.

therefore able to offer independent advice. His or her role can be somewhat murky to say the least and again heavily dependent not only on the president but the individual filling that role. Sometimes their role is spelled out with definitive language. The National Security Presidential Directive One that President Bush signed in February, 2001 specifically states, “The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, at my direction and in consultation with the other regular attendees of the NSC, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording NSC actions and Presidential decisions.”²⁵ By establishing the agenda, the NSA²⁶ has considerable influence on what the President sees and the information he uses to make decisions. There have been outstanding cases of effective performance, starting with McGeorge Bundy’s critical role during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Likewise, there have been some astonishing failures, such as the actions that led to the Iran-Contra Affair under President Reagan. However, the job does ebb and flow; even those who did the job well, such as Bundy, experienced failures (the Bay of Pigs), while those who appeared less successful proved at times to be very effective managers of the NSC system, like the decision on the troop surge in Iraq.

Even though the NSA lacks legislative authority to control agencies budgets, his place as “ear to the president” cannot be overlooked. The ability to control the flow of information is probably the greatest power the NSA possesses and Henry Kissinger was the master of this skill. His memorandum in January, 1969 was very direct:

All communication directed to the President originating in executive departments and agencies, including those from department and agency heads, should be delivered to the office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs. The NSC

²⁴ Richard A. Best, *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*, Congressional Research Service, 6 Feb 2009, 7.

²⁵ White House, National Security Presidential Directive One, Washington DC, 13 February 2001.

²⁶ For clarification, in this paper “NSA” refers to the National Security Advisor as opposed to the commonly used, National Security Agency.

office under the direction of the Assistant to the President will establish secretariat control of all incoming papers prior to forwarding them to the office of the President. National security papers which the president asked upon or otherwise disposed of will be preceded out of the President Secretariat to the NSC office. Any subsequent actions required, such as the relay of Presidential decisions, return of signed correspondence or follow-up on Presidential comments will be accompanied under the direction of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.²⁷

No NSA since has wielded as much power as Henry Kissinger but the key point is they do not have legislative authority over any federal department. Personalities go a long way in decision making, but resource controls go farther.

Today, President Obama has ordered a sweeping overhaul of the National Security Council by expanding its membership and increasing its authority. His new NSA, retired Marine General James Jones, wants a return to Bundy/Kissinger days in that he will run the process and be President Obama's primary instrument of national security counsel. They want to stop the back channeling of information that various department secretaries used to try and influence former President Bush. Jones said, "We're not always going to agree on everything. So it's my job to make sure that the minority opinion is represented," to the president. "But if at the end of the day he turns to me and says, 'Well, what do you think Jones?,' I'm going to tell him what I think."²⁸

It is exactly this kind of theme why America needs an IW czar. We have clung too long to stovepiped decision-making process that makes policy difficult to develop and even harder to implement. Irregular warfare and the mechanisms required for successful implementation require way beyond the capacity of any single department or agency to solve. America needs major structural, cultural, and definitive changes to the interagency process to develop IW themes and operations and integrate government actions. The National Security Advisor cannot possibly

²⁷ Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China*, (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 47.

spend his day focused solely on IW; there are too many daily actions and crises that require his or her attention. The IW czar, though, needs the power and influence, and the leadership and management traits of McGeorge Bundy and Henry Kissinger, to successfully integrate the myriad of agencies to push the IW agenda forward and with success. He needs to learn the mistakes and successes of a past czar, like William Bennett, and apply to them to the IW fight.

²⁸ Karen Young, "Obama's NSC Will Get New Power; Directive Expands Makeup and Role of Security Body," Washington Post, 8 February 2009.

Chapter 5

Interagency Interdependence

My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. .

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

The United States foray into irregular warfare is not new. America has a long history of integrating political and military actions worldwide dating back to incidents such as the Philippine Insurrection in the early twentieth century or the “Banana Wars” in Central America and the Caribbean. These events were categorized as “small wars” in the past and even as early as 1940; the military still took the lead in conducting interagency operations. A statement out of the 1940 United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual quotes, “Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign. This feature has been so marked in past operations that marines have been referred to as State Department Troops in small wars.”²⁹ The USG has planned and

²⁹ US Marine Corps Manual NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual*, 1940, 11.

conducted IW operations well in the past but without a clearly defined leader to guide the efforts it appears that institutionally we forgot how to be successful.

Our last IW campaign was in Vietnam. One of the better reports on lessons learned from the Vietnam War came from Robert Komer and was titled, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam.” In this report, there are several themes that emerge that provide excellent background and context to leading IW efforts today. The basic premise is “why it proved so difficult to translate perception into policy, policy into program, and program into practice in a manner commensurate with felt needs.”³⁰ This is certainly the dilemma facing the USG today reference IW operations. The Gordian knot to untie is how the IW czar counters unconventional threats in this fight with conventional government institutions and their processes. The decision to implement an IW czar will come down to who will be the person or agency to serve as the forcing function across the interagency and in the theater of operations.

Department of Defense

The Defense and State Departments, along with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have begun collaborating more, although slowly, to improve interagency cooperation. The real impetus has come from several documents, primarily the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Interestingly enough, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published the same month as the 2006 and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, published the month before the 2006 QDR, makes no mention of IW. It is chiefly through the 2006 QDR, that the DoD has begun, in earnest, its focus on IW.

³⁰ Robert Komer. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA., 1972, 10.

The QDR states that “although U.S. military forces maintain their predominance in traditional warfare, they must also be improved to address irregular warfare; catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and disruptive threats to the United States.”³¹ It clearly states that, “irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations.”³² Consequently, the Defense Department has been at the forefront of managing, conducting, and planning IW operations and/or stability operations.

Perhaps the biggest operational and structural changes undertaken to wage the IW campaign have come from within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). To enhance U.S. capabilities for the global war on terrorism and irregular warfare, for example, the 2006 QDR called for increasing by a third the number of Army Special Forces battalions, civil affairs personnel, and psychological operations forces; establishing a 2,600-person Marine Corps Special Operations component; increasing Navy SEAL team levels; establishing an SOF (Special Operations Forces) manned Aerial Vehicle squadron; making conventional ground forces more “SOF-like”; and putting more of the department’s resources into critical areas such as human intelligence, linguistics, and cultural awareness. This expansion is intended to relieve the global shortfall of United States SOF. Currently, USSOCOM expects that it will continue to see over 90 percent of its deployed forces deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations.³³ In fact, more than 80 percent of their assets are currently in two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan,

³¹ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 3.

³² *Ibid.*, 36.

³³ Defense Department, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/debudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/pdfs/operation/03_SOCOM_%20Supp_OP-5.pdf.

which, in the words of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC) Micheal Vickers, is “a two-country solution to a 60-country problem.”³⁴

USSOCOM’s primacy role in IW is due in part to the 2008 DoD directive on IW ordering the ASD/SOLIC&IC to “serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IW and provide overall policy oversight within DOD.”³⁵ The nine core activities of special operations forces have significant overlap with an irregular warfare campaign; counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations and information operations, and synchronizing the Department of Defense activities for the global war on terror.

The Commander of USSOCOM established an IW directorate in June, 2007 to provide continuous focus on IW issues, including programmatic and resourcing.³⁶ One of the best protocols established by that office is the creation of a standing Interagency Task Force (IATF) comprised of members of the interagency and personnel from USSOCOM. The best resource is these people are directly connected to their respective entity, which provides reliable, timely, and accurate information to solve IW issues. The command has also staffed an Interagency Partnership Program that places current SOCOM officers throughout 13 federal agencies. In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, the director of the IW cell highlighted the Global Synchronization process as their best effort. This program is a continuous system fusing

³⁴ Statement of Michael G. Vickers, “Special Operations Force Capability, Capacity and Posture Gaps for the Global War on Terrorism,” unclassified testimony before the House Armed Services Committee panel on Gaps-Terrorism and Radical Islam, 26 October 2005.

³⁵ Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 December 2008, 5.

³⁶ Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, “Posture of Special Operations Forces,” unclassified testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, 4 March 2008, 11.

the Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, the interagency, and America's allies efforts in the war on terror.³⁷ This effort is exactly the type of synergistic effort that the IW czar should orchestrate but only on an even higher level.

USSOCOM is postured to lead the Defense Department's irregular warfare efforts because of the unconventional warfare (UW) mindset required for success. Unlike direct action missions, which are generally quick campaigns against specific targets, UW can last months, even years. UW missions give SOF time to build relationships with local militia or natives, who are taught a variety of tactics. This allows SOF access, build relationships, gain influence with the district leaders, and ultimately legitimize the U.S. in the country. Although not in the headlines, the effects of the "soft" approach in IW operations have yielded tremendous success in the Pacific area. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) contribution in the Philippines exemplifies a successful interagency, multinational indirect approach to combating terror.

After 9/11, SOCPAC deployed to the heavily populated Muslim south of the Philippines for the first time since World War II. SOCPAC, led by then Brigadier General (now Lieutenant General) Donald Wurster's Joint Task Force 510, deployed to Basilan Island in January 2002. The island was known to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the locals as a terrorist safe haven and because of very strict rules of engagement, SOCPAC was only allowed to advise and assist the AFP. Using his ground force commander, then Colonel (now Lieutenant General) David Fridovich, they conducted a series of surveys to learn what the people of Basilan needed to sever their ties with the terrorists.

Working with non-governmental organizations and the interagency, JTF-510 built several bridges and a pier, constructed an airstrip, paved numerous roads, built a new hospital and

³⁷ Statement of Col Joseph E. Osborne, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate, US Operations Command, "Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations," before House Armed Services Committee, 26 February 2008, 6.

upgraded several schools. The task force discovered 2-3 children a day were dying on the island of Basilan due to poor water quality, and immediately focused money, time and resources towards building numerous fresh water wells. They imported medical and dental capability teams that treated tens of thousands of Filipinos and continue today. As Admiral Fargo, former commander of Pacific Command, noted, “The results, while clearly supporting the humanitarian needs of the Filipinos, will also continue to aid the AFP in their operational objective. The lessons are pretty clear – it is the proper synchronization of both combat capability and civic action that breeds success.”³⁸

This is only one example of successful IW operations on a tactical scale that produced strategic success. It is also an excellent model of DoD, DoS, USAID, and other agencies working together to breed results with the host nation and how America will win the irregular warfare fight worldwide.

Department of State

Despite the recent global recession, the United States still has the world’s largest economy, and more than a third of the top 500 global companies are American, including six out of the top ten. There is not another global power even close, and yet American hard power does not always transform into influence. America is winning the hard power segment in today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, today, victory in the irregular warfare frame depends on drawing their citizens to our side away from the radical fundamentalists and helping them to build

³⁸ Admiral Tom Fargo, “SOCPAC change of command,” Fort Shafter, HI, 21 January 2003. http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst2003/030121socpac_coc.shtml.

capable, democratic states. It is far easier to attract the population to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.³⁹

The opposite of hard (read military and economic) is soft power. The term was coined by Harvard University professor Joseph Nye. He explained it as, “indirect way to get what you want without tangible threats or payoffs...co-opts people rather than coerces them...soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”⁴⁰ The irony is that some of the most successful uses of soft power have been military missions, such as the Tsunami Relief in the Pacific or hurricane assistance in Central America. Because of the change in the winds of warfare and national security, a combination of both hard power and soft power are needed.

To do this, the new administration of President Barack Obama and the State Department has decided on a course of “smart power”. In her nomination testimony, Secretary Clinton said, “We must use what has been called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”⁴¹ The question becomes what is smart power?

Smart power is simply a combination of both hard and soft. Smart power is “developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action.”⁴² This is a daunting task for the new

³⁹ Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter More Secure America*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: 2007), 7.

⁴⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs Pub, 2005), 5.

⁴¹ Nomination to be Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, January 13, 2009.

⁴² CSIS Smart Power, p. 7.

administration but not unachievable. For the first time in recent memory, the politics of cooperation between Cabinet level secretaries are producing positive leaps in interagency teamwork.

In a speech at Kansas State University in November, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.”⁴³

In December, 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive Forty-Four that specifically was aimed at “improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”⁴⁴ Its stated purpose is at the heart of integrating IW operations. The directive spells out that, “To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.”⁴⁵ These actions need to translate to the IW fight so that the reconstruction and stabilization phase can flow smoother.

⁴³ Speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, November 26, 2007.

⁴⁴ National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, The White House, Washington DC., December 7, 2005.

⁴⁵ NSPD 44.

Much like America's success in the Philippines, the most important component of the IW campaign will be not in fighting soldier to insurgent, but the cooperation and integration of the various agencies and how well the U.S. prepares our partner nations to defend and govern themselves. The State Department, along with USAID, leads the work in promoting development assistance, free trade, and diplomacy. Yet, they cannot do it without security. Without safekeeping, there can be no development and without development there can not be democratic ideals in effect. It has become a global counterinsurgency effort requiring all departments to work together.

In early 2009, the USG released a Counterinsurgency (COIN) guide, signed by the SECDEF, the SECSTATE, and the head of USAID. This document is the first of its kind in over fifty years and succinctly points out the "counterinsurgency places great demands on the ability of bureaucracies to work together, with allies, and increasingly, with nongovernmental organizations. That it is co-signed by the leaders of the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development says a great deal about the partnership between these and other departments that has been, and will be, required if we are to succeed in the future."⁴⁶ It further states, that "COIN is an extremely complex undertaking, which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field, but also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related disciplines."⁴⁷ In fact, the US Army Field Manual 3-24 for COIN specifically states, "Command and control of all U.S. Government organizations engaged in a COIN mission should be exercised by a single leader through a formal command and control system."⁴⁸ The underlying problem with not only this document, but all others that reference IW

⁴⁶ USG, "USG: Counterinsurgency Guide; USG Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2006), preface.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 2-2.

is that they all agree it requires integration but none designate a leader for IW/COIN, only suggest it.

Chapter 6

The Right Path to the IW Czar

*Our wretched species is so made that those who walk on the well-trodden path
always throw stones at those who are showing a new road*

-Voltaire

President Obama's early foreign policy statements and moves indicate that he will continue operating in an IW mode. Probably the most significant indicators may be found in his National Security appointments. The first key signal came when President Obama confirmed that he would continue with Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense and named (retired) USMC General James L. Jones as his National Security Advisor. Other appointments, including (retired) US Navy Admiral Dennis Blair to be Director of National Intelligence, and Michele Flournoy as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, along with keeping Michael Vickers on as ASD/SOLIC. All these moves point to President Obama's assurances that irregular warfare themes will remain at the forefront of US policy, strategy and operations for the foreseeable future.

Other key indicators have been found in recent documents codifying IW's importance. The Defense Department Directive (DoDD) 3000.07 established the policy that irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Under DoDD 3000.07, ASD Vickers, a former special forces and Central Intelligence Agency operative who is considered one of the key architects behind the CIA's covert war with the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, became the DoD's principal advisor on irregular warfare and the person who will

provide overall policy oversight to ensure the defense department is transformed to be as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare. Directive 3000.07 also built on former president George W Bush's NSPD-44 and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's DoDD 3000.05, both issued in late 2005. These directives had already placed stability operations on par with traditional operations. Likewise, the 2006 QDR and the US Army FM 3-24 both demonstrate an increasing emphasis on IW.

Other key, IW-related developments during the Bush administration included former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's "transformational diplomacy" initiative. She announced this in January 2006; it called for "a more cooperative working relationship between American diplomats and the US military" yet she stated we will continue to have separate chains of command between the military and State department in joint operations.⁴⁹

Yet her statement lies at the heart of the problem; no one single unifying voice for IW. In a speech in 2004, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Peter Pace was asked whether a GNA-like change for the interagency process was needed. "Might we, at the national level, ask our Cabinet-level individuals to give up some of their day-to-day prerogatives and authority in a way that they will pick up in spades at the National Security Council level? So that when the president says, for example, we are going to do this in Afghanistan, he would also say that the lead agency for this is going to be the Department of State. And when perhaps he would say we're going to do something else in Iraq, he would say, and the lead agency for that will be the Department of Defense. And what that empowerment will do, in my mind, would be to give to the Cabinet-level officials the authority that we currently give to our combatant commanders when we assign them missions." General Pace continued, "So the parallelism here is the service

⁴⁹ Steven Donald Smith, "Better Jointness Needed Between Military and Diplomats, Rice Says," *American Forces Press News Articles*, 18 January 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14581>.

chiefs as Joint Chiefs; the Cabinet-level department heads as members of the NSC; the combatant commanders wearing uniforms; and an entity here in Washington yet to be named, if ever named, that would be led by Department of Defense, Department of State, whoever it was that the president said would lead this particular event for the country; so that on a day-to-day basis, just like a JTF commander, the individual selected by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State or whoever -- whichever secretary it was, that individual, just like a JTF commander, would have the authority to tell folks in the government in various agencies to get this job done.”⁵⁰ His words are precisely the thinking behind creating an IW czar and naming that entity yet to be named.

Currently, the national security institutions of the USG are the same organizations constructed to win the Cold War. Appointing an IW czar would require a passage of legislation similar in premise to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. It would formalize the interagency process to focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military as SECDEF Gates stated. It should be able to fold existing and relevant elements of the interagency focused on IW into an organization that could collocate personnel with prioritized policy options and strategies, foster relevant strategic communications, and as importantly, allocate resources to this effort.

Blueprint for IW Legislation

Trying to create legislation to establish the office of the IW czar would be demanding, challenging, and grueling to say the least. Rather than reinventing the wheel, the broad

⁵⁰ General Peter Pace, “Extemporaneous Remarks Delivered to the Marine Corps Association/Naval Institute Forum 2004,” 7 September 2004.

guidelines Congress set when they passed the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 provide a solid blueprint for an office of irregular warfare director.

The first issue in the 1998 act and in IW operations is the instructing the respective agency to develop a long-term national IW strategy. With respect to our current fight, there is no dearth of strategy or strategy related documents to clearly indicate our nation's goals. The National Security Strategy of the United States opens with its distinguished goal -- "it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world and proceeds to spell out nine different tasks to achieve these goals."⁵¹ Several other documents also establish IW as the way we will fight and the strategy to achieve success; the Quadrennial Defense Review, the IW Roadmap, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Military Strategy are just a few of the publications. It is hard to argue that we do not have a strategy embedded in those documents. However, the USG needs to publish one overarching strategy that combines the facets of those and related publications which clearly include comprehensive, long-range, quantifiable goals and contain five-year projections for program and budget priorities.

A key provision in establishing the IW czar would be the president defining his leadership role. This may sound somewhat vague or too general but as stated earlier, access to the president means power. One of the themes Bill Bennett pointed out in his early tenure as the drug czar that his effectiveness was based on how much support he had from the White House, saying "his power in that sense was derivative."⁵² Much like the 1998 act empowered the director to serve as the administration's spokesperson on drug issues and to monitor progress of the agencies in meeting goals and objectives, the IW czar needs the same license. He or she needs to be the

⁵¹ President, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006," 1.

⁵² Bennett, 98.

voice of IW; there should be no second guessing on who is in charge of the USG's IW operations.

The IW czar would be able to recognize that irregular warfare is distinctive from both war and peace and requires the marriage of all elements. By merging personnel into one single office, it would allow the long-term development (both military and civilian) of career personnel dedicated to ascertain the right means, strategies, and methods for IW. When Congress passed the Goldwater Nichols Act, it very clearly stated the SECDEF has the sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which he chooses to act. The bill mandated the way the services interacted and dramatically changed the personnel management of military officers. By passing a similar bill, Congress could ensure unity of command and effort within IW operations and hold accountable one person for integrating a whole of government approach to IW. By having one voice, each agency or department's strengths could be maximize and conversely, minimize redundancies. But perhaps the most important aspect of formalizing an IW czar is that this individual would not be aligned with any executive agency. He or she would be unbiased and have the president's authority to focus on irregular warfare goals, rather trying to protect the DoS or DoD's budget.

Understanding the fiscal realities in today's environment, the appetite for creating a new organization is very low. A counter argument would be to instill the powers of leading the IW fight to the NSA. However, the NSA has two very incompatible roles today; supporting the President and being the honest broker among the executive departments. Granted, the latter function would be a prerequisite for the IW czar but there are too many other issues, especially on the domestic front, that require the NSA and ultimately the president's time and focus (i.e., the economy in 2009).

Perhaps the biggest issue in creating an IW czar and office is that of change. The current national security structure has remained relatively effective for several decades so why change it now? The USG has a very archaic, vertical, “stove-pipe” organizational structure and the processes it uses undermine success in operations and policy implementation. Unity of effort and a whole-of-government approach to devising solutions to critical problems is sometimes almost non-existent. Administrations are too busy with day to day operations to see the need for change; President Obama’s recent remarks indicate this precisely. Speaking at his 100th day news conference he was asked, what is he surprised and troubled the most by and responded, “And so the typical President I think has two or three big problems; we’ve got seven or eight big problems. ...managing a whole host of issues that had come up that weren’t necessarily envisioned a year and a half ago. Troubled? I’d say less troubled, but sobered by the fact that change in Washington comes slow; that there is still a certain quotient of political posturing and bickering that takes place even when we’re in the middle of really big crises.”⁵³ This does not include trying to change structures, roles, and responsibilities amongst the bureaucrats themselves. The career bureaucrats within the departments and agencies have worked hard to advance specific programs that take years to implement and they are naturally protective of their life’s work and will resist any change that they perceive as a threat.

Finally, the term IW czar is in name only. The complexities of IW operations require a leader; a leader with the president’s authority. The legislation that created the drug czar could be used a basis for creating an office the director of irregular warfare. The director/czar would be subjected to Senate confirmation and have the responsibility for integrating interagency strategies and plans for executing IW operations. This office would be responsible for planning

⁵³Transcript of President Obama’s 100th Day News Conference, The Wall Street Journal, <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/04/30/transcript-of-obamas-100th-day-press-conference>.

and implementing the president's national security strategy for IW and synchronizing the various agencies' plans into a unified operation. Legislation to create this office would improve IW operations, and ultimately, national security through development of long-range strategic policy and achieve a better balance amongst the entire array of national instruments of power. Lastly, in the era of budgetary constraints and limited funding, naming an IW czar and providing a new office to collocate IW minded-personnel could streamline the national security machine and stop replicating efforts.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

We need to be prepared to fight a different war. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, war by guerilla, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires, in those situations where we encounter it, a whole new strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.

-John F. Kennedy,
1962 United States Military Academy Commencement Speech

The recurring theme from the 9/11 Commission was that “no one was firmly in charge of managing the case and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government, assigns responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress, and quickly bring obstacles up to the level where they could be resolved.”⁵⁴ American history is littered with successes and failures due to poor leadership in contingency operations. The battle of Mogadishu resulted from an absence of strategy and poor advice, leaving our troops without the necessary weapon systems to handle the uprising. Yet, the lessons learned from Somalia provided planning for the Haiti invasion to have a pol-mil plan in place for greater unity of effort. Because of the dynamic security environment of IW operations, future operations will require not only

⁵⁴ 9/11 Commission, 400.

interagency play but international engagement as well. There must be one person leading these efforts.

To be successful as the IW czar, not only will the person require the talents and characteristics of a Henry Kissinger or William Bennett, but will have to overcome a myriad of institutional inertia within the interagencies. There are several reasons for this, mainly a lack of institutional memory, a notable dearth of systematic analysis of performance, again mainly because of the inherent reluctance of organizations to indulge in self-examination, and a traditionalist view of civil-military relationships. IW operations will require a director that can use the whole of government approach to provide direction and have a common interest in a successful outcome for all agencies.

The National Security Council is what the president decides it is. Historically, it has been either a weak, loosely banded meeting place or led by some of the strongest personalities to ever serve in the United States government. The NSC and the NSA have a lead role to play in developing a strategy across the interagency spectrum. The council is there to advise the president of the relative, or irrelative, merits of different approaches to national security problems. The NSA is supposed to be an independent broker of these competing interests. They tend to view the world as a puzzle and are constantly trying to decipher it, one news story at a time. The new NSA, General Jones, is attempting to change this approach. In his remarks to the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, he acknowledged that the “NSC must be strategic, as I mentioned. It is easy to get bogged down in the tactical concerns that consume the day-to-day conduct. As a matter of fact, it is much more enjoyable to be involved at the tactical level. But we won’t effectively advance the priorities if we spend our time reacting to events, instead

of shaping them. And that requires strategic thinking.”⁵⁵ This is difficult as a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report points out, “there is little capacity on the National Security Council staff dedicated to integrating agency strategies and plans or monitoring their execution, even though both are critical to achieving unity of effort across the U.S. government and success on the ground.”⁵⁶

There are several challenges the IW czar will have to overcome. Perhaps the most daunting will be forcing bureaucracies to get out of their comfort zones and stop doing what they have grown accustomed. There are other tasks that may be equally as overwhelming including overcoming the human capital problem. The USG must be able to hire, train, and retain people who can work in the federal government and not constantly think the grass is greener outside the department. One of the key problems with naming an IW czar rather than having a congressionally mandated Special Assistant to the President is the lack of any formal authority. Unless Congress is involved, the czar will not control a budget or be able to hire and fire personnel. He needs to be able to coordinate State Department diplomatic efforts, provide guidance and direction to other agencies, and synchronize and direct the actions of the Defense Department. Just like the drug czar, the IW czar needs these authorities or will be irrelevant.

In order to make IW operations successful, some drastic but not revolutionary modifications to the national security machine are required. Like the 1947 National Security Act and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act prepared and facilitated our efforts in the Cold War, legislative changes are needed for the war on terror. Having one person in charge of IW will bring the synergies required for a specific purpose to ultimately be decided by the President. One of the telling

⁵⁵ White House “Remarks at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy,” The White House, 9 February 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksByNationalSecurityAdviserJonesAt45thMunichConferenceOnSecurityPolicy/.

premises from the CSIS report was that an “examination of the coordinating mechanisms used in both the Clinton and Bush administrations suggested that U.S. civilian and military leaders tend to develop new approaches in each operation. These *ad hoc*, often personality-driven approaches too often ignore the experience gleaned from previous operations.”⁵⁷ America’s fight in the irregular warfare fight is too important and the consequences too great, to leave it to an ad hoc committee when one person can lead our efforts-the IW czar.

⁵⁶ CSIS report, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, (Washington DC: CSIS press, March 2004), 61.

⁵⁷ CSIS Report, 44.

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